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Abstract 
This paper examines how ideas of postnational constitutionalism and postnational public law 
have developed and will likely continue to develop in ways that are in some respects 
complementary and in other respects in tension. Both terms are neologisms - recently emergent 
concepts seeking to adapt legal-normative ideas suited to one (state) context to another 
(postnational) context. To subscribe to either, or to both, is already to take sides against a broad 
church of postnational sceptics, and instead to view the legal forms and vocabulary of statehood 
as a mobile resource and as an indispensable part of any answer to the question of the authority 
of the expanding domain of law beyond the state under conditions of globalisation. Yet beyond 
this basic threshold of agreement, postnational constitutionalists and postnational public lawyers 
tend to differ in emphasis. Whereas the former focus on the 'constitutive' or 'input' side of state-
like law at the myriad new sites of postnational authority, the latter tend to concentrate on the 
'throughput' or 'output' side of state-like law in postnational contexts. For the former, authority 
and legitimacy tend to be a function of particular pedigree and collective subjectivity, whereas 
for the latter authority and legitimacy tend to be a function of general ‘public’ norms and 
procedures and supposedly objective standards. These differences are motivated by normative 
preferences, and also by differing diagnoses of the postnational environment and different 
estimations of law's possibilities and limitations under these circumstances. Other approaches 
that try to reach beyond this normative and diagnostic division to combine or reconcile input and 
output, particular and general, subjective and objective, must do in appreciation of the fact that 
the basic opposition in question cannot be entirely eradicated. Rather, it reflects the deep and 
resilient ambivalence of the aspirational horizon associated with the age of political modernity - 
as relevant to the postnational phase as to the state-centred phase - in which the values of 
autonomy and equality within a constructed socio-political project have displaced earlier notions 
of conformity and status in accordance with a pre-given order of things. For under these modern 
conditions law must be concerned both to endorse and facilitate the collective pursuit of 
autonomy and equality and to protect the core individual expression of these values from 
collective encroachment. 
 
Keywords 
Postnational; constitutionalism; public law; global administrative law; societal constitutionalism; 
constituent power; input legitimacy; throughput legitimacy; output legitimacy 
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Postnational Constitutionalism and Postnational Public Law: a tale 
of two neologisms 
 
(i) Two Neologisms 
 
A great deal of conceptual contestation, and no less confusion, attends the busy 
contemporary debate over the prospects and desirability of constitutionalism beyond the state, or 
what is sometimes called postnational constitutionalism. The idea of ‘public law,’ or of a more 
general association of ‘law' with ‘publicness’, is sometimes offered as a crucial move in this 
debate. It is presented as a way of staking out of the semantic high ground, the key to resolving 
differences of perspective.
1
 But since, as we shall see the meaning and scope of a postnational 
'public law' is also unclear and conflicted, this device contains no magic formula and can offer no 
decisive resolution of the higher profile contestation about constitutionalism beyond the state.
2
 
This should not surprise us. Both key terms – postnational constitutionalism and postnational 
public law - are neologisms. They are recently emergent formulations coined in recognition of an 
ever denser web of transnational legal relations, which is one important dimension of the 
contemporary pattern of globalization.
3
 Both terms, and the themes they address, are products of 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, B. Kingsbury, “The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law” (2009) 20 European 
Journal of International Law 23-57; “International Law as Inter-Public Law” in H. S. Richardson and M.S. 
Williams (eds) Moral Universalism and Pluralism (New York: NYU Press, 2009) 167-2004; N. Krisch, Beyond 
Constitutionalism?(Oxford: OUP, 2010); A Von Bogdandy, P. Dann and M. Goldmann, “Developing the Publicness 
of Public International Law: Towards a legal framework for Global Governance Activities” (2008) 9 German Law 
Journal 1375-1400; See J. Waldron, “Can There be a Democratic Jurisprudence?” in New York University Public 
law and Legal Theory Working Papers (2008) 35. Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1280923. 
2
 My claim is not that the debate about transnational constitutionalism has a higher profile than the debate about 
transnational public law in the sense of being regarded as more important or attracting more intense debate within 
legal scholarship. That is a moot point, and undoubtedly the academic debate on law’s ‘publicness’ has attracted 
increasing attention in recent years. See e.g. C Michelon, G. Clunie, C. McCorkindale and H. Psarras (eds) The 
Public in Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012) My argument is a more basic one; that at the level of wider public 
awareness and participation, the constitutional debate retains the greater resonance, particularly in Europe in the 
context and in the aftermath of the debate over a written Constitution for the European Union; see ns52-55 below.  
3
 See e.g. P. Zumbansen, “Comparative, global and transnational constitutionalism: The emergence of a 
transnational legal-pluralist order” (2012) 1 Global Constitutionalism 16-52. 
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the disruption of the state-centred “order of orders”4 of the high modern age, and of the open-
ended search for a new language of legal authority adequate to a shifting global political and 
economic configuration. Both terms, therefore, have a speculative quality, at best a tentative hold 
on the legal imagination.
5
 They have arisen out of a shifting legal landscape and address still 
unsettled features of that landscape. So we should not expect one term to guarantee the stable 
grounding that the other cannot provide for itself. 
   Nevertheless, there is merit in pursuing discussion of these two concepts on the same page. 
For, importantly, ideas of postnational constitutionalism and postnational public law or legal 
publicness, while displaying significant differences of focus and emphasis, begin from the same 
broad approach to the problem of legal authority in a globalizing age. They start from the 
premise that is both desirable and possible to adapt a historically state-concentrated discourse of 
legal authority to the increasingly dense post-state regulatory environment. They both suppose, 
in other words, that the kind of law which for long was the exclusive or predominant domain of 
the state, and whose very authority is intimately associated with that of the state – whether 
‘constitutional’ or ‘public’ law – ought to be and is capable of being drawn upon and applied to 
new non-state-based contexts of regulation. 
    Situating postnational constitutionalism and postnational public law within the one 
framework of inquiry, therefore, as the present chapter seeks to do, can help us to clarify and 
address much of what is at stake in the broader debate about law’s transnational resonance. As a 
threshold concern, this inclusive framework allows us to specify and illuminate the division 
between those who see the legal forms and vocabulary of statehood as a mobile resource, and as 
an indispensable part of any answer to the question of the authority of the expanding domain of 
law beyond the state, and those who do not. Beyond that threshold, our framework then allows 
us to identify the main options available in adapting a state-concentrated discourse to a 
postnational environment, permits us to tease out the strengths and weakness of these options, 
and invites us to explore the important points of agreement and contention between them. In 
conclusion, it will be argued that the possibilities and the difficulties of reconciling these various 
adaptations, far from demonstrating the intrinsic inappropriateness of taking ideas of 
                                                 
4
 N. Walker “Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of Normative Orders” 
(2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 373-396.  
5
 Ibid. See also N. Walker Intimations of Global Law (unpublished manuscript, 2012) 
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constitutionalism and public law beyond the state, indicate quite the opposite. For what we are 
faced with is in fact strongly reminiscent of the mix of mutual support and tension between 
different dimensions of constitutionalism and public law that has long obtained in the state 
setting.   
     But before embarking on this course of inquiry, we need to provide some further 
clarification of our focal terms. The comparison between postnational constitutionalism and 
postnational public law is facilitated by the fact that, in addition to their substantive common 
ground – their sharing of the same combination of endorsement of the statist legacy and post-
state aspirational horizon, they also display the same basic range of forms of reference. Each root 
term, ‘constitutionalism’ and 'public law', is used both, in the manner of an external account, to 
indicate the materials of an established genre of practical reason, and to articulate an open-ended 
set of claims internal to the established genre, including both ‘jurisdictional’ claims about the 
applicability of the genre to different contexts and action-generating claims drawing upon the 
resources of the genre in deciding practical questions. Each term, it follows, embraces both a 
(quasi) descriptive
6
 dimension, as viewed from a detached standpoint, as well as diagnostic and 
prescriptive dimensions, as assumed from an engaged standpoint. 
        First, at the level of external description, we refer, using the 'c' word or the 'p' word, to 
the inventory of existing legal forms, institutions and discourses that are conventionally 
understood as 'constitutional' or 'public'. So, in this descriptive mode, we use the terms 
constitutional law and public law to record and report upon the vast array of structures - from 
written Constitutions to the various organs of government - and of processes - from democratic 
legislation to judicial review - that fall within the relevant established canon of positive law. 
Secondly, at the diagnostic level, we invoke our key terms to refer to the range of situations, 
including but not necessarily limited to those that already exhibit the relevant legal forms, 
institutions and discourses, which we deem to be appropriately understood and evaluated in 
'constitutional' or 'public' terms. So we conceive, in this diagnostic mode, of situations or 
circumstances as of ‘constitutional’ import, not only because the conventional legal materials 
                                                 
6
 Of course, reporting on social ‘facts’ is always more than mere description. No social phenomena are self-
describing and no account of social phenomena is uninfluenced by the perspective and priorities of the account-
giver. Even the most detached account of a relatively stable and institutionally embedded social phenomena such as 
legal rules, therefore, involves an element of selection and interpretation. Hence the qualifier ‘quasi’. 
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may be much in evidence, but also where we deem deeper standards of fit to be met; where, for 
instance, the relevant situations or circumstances presuppose or conduce to the establishment of 
fundamental legal authority or engage basic rights. Similarly, we conceive of situations and 
circumstances as appropriate vehicles for or venues of 'public law' not only because the relevant 
doctrinal forms are already in place, but also where, for example, particular populations self-
understood or recognized as ‘publics’ are addressed, supposedly 'public' functions or interests are 
engaged, or certain collective characteristics of the production and supply of benefits obtain - as 
in the classical economic conception of "public goods"
7
. Thirdly, at the prescriptive level, we use 
the language of 'constitutionalism' or invoke the ‘public’ quality of law to call upon a set of 
standards and values of legal provision - again including but not necessarily limited to those 
standards and values already contained in existing legal forms, institutions and discourses. The 
various standards and values involved operate at different levels of abstraction; from highly 
general ideas such as dignity, equality and liberty, through broadly institutionalized goods, such 
as the Rule of Law, separation of powers or Parliamentary Government, to more specific 
standards and mechanisms of general pertinence across government (e.g., standards of 'good 
administration' or of probity in public office,) or between government and citizens (e.g., 
catalogues of individual ‘freedom’ and forms of judicial and other redress).8 
    We will have more to say about the different dimensions of constitutional and public law 
in the sections below. However, one broad conclusion can be anticipated. For constitutional and 
public law, in their strongly overlapping but distinct ways, the relationship between the three 
dimensions, relayed along a mutually reinforcing circuit, accounts for a strong bias towards a 
state-embedded conception of law. Both our diagnosis of the appropriateness of contexts to 
treatment in constitutional or public law terms and our sense of the relevant standards and values 
of treatment are heavily influenced by the vast, cumulative datum of established state institutions 
and practice. Reciprocally, the standing – and our understanding - of existing state institutions 
and practice as paradigmatically 'constitutional' or 'public' is corroborated by our continuously 
reinforced sense of what counts as appropriate 'constitutional' or 'public' contexts, values and 
                                                 
7
 Which counts public goods as those displaying the twin attributes of non-excludability and non-rivalness of 
consumption. See e.g. J. M. Buchanan, “Public Goods in Theory and Practice: A Note on the Minasian-Samuelson 
Discussion.” (1967) 10 Journal of Law and Economics 193–197. 
8
 For one particularly rich discussion of the range, variety and diverse levels of constitutional goods, see A. Brudner, 
Constitutional Goods (Oxford: OUP, 2004). 
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standards. What remains to be seen is what, if any, scope there is for either constitutionalism or 
public law to break out of this confirmatory circle of state-centredness.  
2. Four Perspectives on Postnational Law 
We can distinguish four main positions around which to organize out discussion. These are 
located along a continuum between scepticism and affirmation of the relevance of public law and 
constitutionalism to the transnational context. First and addressing our threshold concern about 
the very possibility and desirability of transposing a state-concentrated and state-embedded 
discourse, there are those who deny the prospects of robust forms of constitutionalism beyond 
the state and who also, typically for closely connected reasons, dismiss the prospects of robust 
forms of public law and publicness beyond the state. We can call this stance, in which there is a 
close causal and conceptual link between publicness, constitutionalism and statehood, one of 
double scepticism of legal transnationalism. Beyond that wholesale rejection of the prospects of 
the transnational relocation of robust forms of state-centred law, there are two more selectively 
sceptical positions. Secondly, then, there are those who are sceptical about the prospects of 
robust forms of constitutionalism beyond the state but not about the prospects of robust forms of 
public law beyond the state. We can call this position one of transnational constitutional 
scepticism. Thirdly, as an alternative form of selective scepticism, there are those who, 
conversely, are sceptical about robust forms of transnational public law, but not about robust 
forms of constitutionalism beyond the state. We can call this position one of transnational public 
law scepticism. And finally, at the opposite end of the continuum, there are those who, with 
differing emphases, are sceptical neither about robust forms of constitutionalism beyond the state 
nor about transnational public law. We can, in shorthand, call this range of positions one of 
double affirmation of the translation of paradigmatically statist forms of legality to the 
transnational domain. 
   We must at the outset say something about the significance of the adjective 'robust' in the 
above classificatory scheme. The point is a simple but important one. For reasons we develop in 
our exploration of double scepticism, no-one, however broadly resistant to the general 
transferability of notion of constitutionalism and public law to the postnational context, would 
disallow that these notions retain some resonance beyond the state. That, indeed, is why we use 
the language of scepticism rather than outright denial in characterizing various positions. As we 
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shall see,
9
 the reasons why even strong sceptics are bound to concede something to the 
postnational position are relevant to our overall conclusions, since they point to features of our 
key concepts that are significant in considering their future prospects. Our immediate priority, 
however, is to sharpen our analytical tools by insisting that a clear line can and should, 
nevertheless, be drawn between the affirmation of 'robust' and 'non-robust' postnational forms. 
By robust forms we mean to include only those forms, first, that indicate significant features of 
the transnational legal landscape, as opposed to marginal phenomena or exotic instances; and, 
secondly, that are or claim to be relatively self-standing and so autonomous from the national 
roots of constitutional and public law.  
3. Double Scepticism 
(a) Two versions of double scepticism 
The double sceptics of transnational constitutionalism and transnational public law range 
across two positions – or, rather, a continuum of possibilities framed by two positions. What 
these positions have in common is that they treat ideas of ‘constitution’ and of ‘public law’ alike 
as so deeply embedded within and as so closely intertwined with the modern state, and as so 
closely implicated in its development, that it becomes difficult if not impossible to conceive of 
how they might prosper once detached from that context. For these positions the confirmatory 
circle of state-centredness is indeed a closed one. 
     One such position is culturalist in nature. It holds the idea of a constitution and of public 
law to be hollow, or at least deficient, in the absence of certain attributes, including the idea of a 
democratically self-constituting and self-constituted ‘people’ – a self-realizing ‘public’ - 
possessing comprehensive powers of self-determination and self-legislation; in so doing 
introducing, as a second sense of ‘publicness’, an internal distinction between a capacious and 
integrated sphere of ‘public’ and so politically negotiable affairs of government, and a domain of 
private and so legal-rights-protected interests. It is claimed, in other words, that our built 
environment of legal and political forms and institutions is ultimately contingent upon certain 
prior or emergent socio-cultural facts concerning identity, solidarity and allegiance, lacking 
which any self-styled constitutional project and any framework of public law dedicated to a 
                                                 
9
 Section 3(b) below.  
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particular ‘public’ and its publicly self-acknowledged affairs and institutions is fated to be either 
a dead letter or a much more modest accomplishment.
10
 Both constitutionalism, typically in the 
form of a foundational event and document, and public law more generally, as the resilient yet 
adaptable normative framework and principles of government, are, on this view, first, products 
of and, only secondly, subsidiary causes and reinforcing guarantees of a certain socio-cultural 
formation. As only the modern state has known such a socio-cultural formation, and since even if 
the modern state is no longer so robust in these terms it still constitutes a standing impediment to 
the development of similar socio-cultural formations at non-state sites, there can be no tangible 
prospect of a full constitutionalism and a full development of public law beyond the state. 
    
 A second double-sceptic position runs even deeper than the culturalist argument and puts a 
state-centred conception of constitutionalism and public law more clearly to the forefront. This 
approach, closely associated in the UK context with the work of Martin Loughlin, has a 
profoundly epistemic quality. It focuses on the very idea of the modern state and of the legal and 
political imaginary associated with the idea of the modern state as embracing “a scheme of 
intelligibility… a comprehensive way of seeing, understanding and acting in the world”11 that is 
simultaneously jurisgenerative and politico-generative in quality. It involves a framing or 
constitutive sense of ‘public law’ - of ius publicum or droit politique – that is necessarily prior 
and prerequisite to a full, modern articulation of the idea of the ‘constitution’ and ‘public law’ 
conceived of as positive law. The key insight here, and what distinguishes it from the culturalist 
position, is that the concept of the modern state, understood as a particular type of pre-positive 
but nevertheless jural relationship between territory, ruling authority and people, is cause rather 
than consequence. It is not the mere expression and fruit of a prior cultural achievement – an 
accomplishment of national affinity and solidarity supplying the “battery of power”12 necessary 
to run the constitutional machine effectively. More than that, the category of the modern state 
involves a way of knowing and a way of being that embrace the idea of a self-constituting and 
self-regulating collective subject with no mandate or justification beyond the compact or consent 
of its individual agents; and in the absence of the self-assertion and self-comprehension of such 
an abstract constituent subject the very idea of a constituted polity is simply unimaginable.  
                                                 
10
 See e.g., D. Grimm, “The Constitution in the Process of Denationalization” (2005) 12 Constellations 447-65. 
11
 See e.g., M. Loughlin, “In Defence of Staatslehre” (2009) 48 Der Staat 1-28. 
12
 M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory (Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 1996) 80. 
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    For all their differences, the two positions – cultural and epistemic – have certain 
important features in common. In both cases the message is strongly conveyed that the modern 
idea and practice of constitutionalism and public law could not have developed in the first place 
except in the context and through the container of the nation and the state, which are themselves 
in one vision (epistemic), but not the other (cultural), already juridical categories. Importantly, 
both approaches conceive of legal authority in similar ways. Both involve a pedigree conception 
of the authority of constitutionalism and of public law, as somehow derived from and dependent 
upon a particular socio-political lineage. Both also involve an emphasis on the affirmative 
dimension of that authority – its manifestation as governing capacity or gubernaculum - as vital 
and prior; though also, as a feature of the reduction of that capacity to positive law, a strain of 
self-discipline and self-limitation in recognition of the underlying rights and interests of the 
individual who make up the collective subject of government.
13
 That is to say, it is the putatively 
democratic or meta-democratic source, whether the cultural substratum of peoplehood or the 
epistemic framing of publicness, that is fundamental and indispensable in bequeathing legitimacy 
to the positive forms of constitutional law and public law more generally and so in securing the 
institutional edifice of an expansive and integrated but self-containing system of government, 
which is the equally fundamental and indispensable expression of public power. And while this 
way of conceiving of legal authority may not, as matter of logical necessity, entirely rule out the 
possibility of a new pedigree and a similarly intense governing capacity - and so of a comparable 
constitutionalism and public law - emerging in other contexts and through a container other than 
the state, it certainly stacks the odds against such a development and places a heavy burden on 
the defenders of post-state constitutionalism to explain just how this might be possible.  
 The strength of the sceptical case is enhanced by one further feature that culturalist and 
epistemic versions share. In both approaches constitutionalism and publicness are closely 
connected and strongly complementary themes. The constitution is either both the consequence 
of a prior sense of the ‘public’ as a putative political community and the source of a further 
normative distinction between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ conceived of as domains of activity 
and interest of that political community, as in the culturalist vision; or it is the deep frame 
through which both these aspects of ‘publicness’ are assumed, as in the epistemic vision. In 
                                                 
13
 See e.g., Loughlin n11 above. See also Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: OUP, 2003) ch.7; Foundations 
of Public Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010) ch.12. 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 2012/20 
 
Page 9 of 28 
 
either case, then, each term - constitutionalism and publicness - tends to reinforce the other in 
foregrounding the nation state horizon.   
   It follows from their emphatic state-centredness that proponents of the double sceptical 
view of constitutionalism and public law tend towards what Mattias Kumm calls the “nostalgic” 
approach to global legal development.
14
 For all the force of their arguments that the intertwined 
ideas and ideals of constitutionalism and public law cannot be unbundled from the state without 
significant cost, the danger of this approach, as always with nostalgia, is of a kind of imaginative 
cul-de-sac. When considering the resources of constitutionalism and public law in a globalizing 
age, their default becomes one of optimism towards the past and pessimism in the face of the 
future. Their options, given their dismissal of any plausible prospect of the comprehensive 
adaptation of the state-suffused registers of constitutionalism and public law in a postnational 
environment, narrow to a defensive consolidation of the reduced remit of a state-centred law, a 
wishful rewinding of that legacy to its Westphalian pomp, or a fatalistic acceptance of the 
exhaustion of a paradigm.
15
 
(b) Concessions to postnationalism 
     Yet we should be careful how far we push this analysis. As already intimated, even the 
most pronouncedly sceptical position would not deny some significance to constitutionalism or 
public law beyond the state.  
If we consider, first, postnational constitutional law, we can point to two distinct strands of 
residual recognition from a sceptical standpoint. On the one hand, the constitutional label, here 
understood as a basic and non-exclusive brand, may be presented as a familiar descriptor of the 
                                                 
14
 M. Kumm, “The best of times and the worst of times” in P. Dobner and M. Loughlin (eds) The Twilight of 
Constitutionalism (2010) 202-219. 
15
 See e.g. Grimm n10 above. Not all double sceptics strike a pessimistic tone, only those (many) who believe 
something is lost in the non-translatability of the resources of constitutionalism and public law to the postnational 
setting. There are two other possibilities. First, the resources of constitutionalism and public law, while still deemed 
appropriate to the nation state context, may be viewed as entirely inappropriate to the market context of postnational 
relations, for which another form of law, far from being ‘second best’, is considered more suitable. See e.g., U. 
Haltern “Pathos and Patina: The Failure and Promise of Constitutionalism in the European Imagination” (2003) 9 
European Law Journal 14-43. Secondly, the resources of constitutionalism and public law may be viewed as of 
limited and declining value even in the nation state context, a conclusion reinforced by the changing nature and less 
dominant role of the state in an age of increasing transnational power and authority. See e.g. K. H. Ladeur “We the 
European People - Relache?” (2008) 14 European Law Journal 147-167. See also Teubner, n41 below, Sabel and 
Zeitlin, n49 below. 
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foundational regulatory framework of many forms of social organization other than states that 
we find situated either within or across states. Legally, these might range from highly informal 
normative arrangements, as with the constitutive rules of many of the intermediate associations 
of national and transnational civil society - from NGOs and charities to political parties and 
sporting associations - to much more formal structures such as the United Nations Charter or 
other framework treaties of international organizations. The consequence, and sometimes - as in 
a prominent British politician's famous comparison of the abortive EU Constitutional Treaty of 
2004 to the constitution of a Golf Club - the explicit aim
16
 of this concession, is to dilute and 
devalue the currency of constitutional language. The suggestion is that many entities can be 
described as constitutional in a thin normative sense without possessing the thick social 
imaginary or cultural roots associated with the modern state. What is merely the topsoil of 
positive rules in the deeply sedimented structure of the state may, therefore, be the sole or 
primary bonding agent in many lesser collective projects that neither possess nor demand the 
breadth or depth of common sympathy or commitment of the state. But where the normative 
framework does stand alone in this way, so the argument runs, what we have is merely a kind of 
constitutionalism-lite;  or, to put it another way, a "constitution without constitutionalism"
17
 - a 
regulatory superstructure which neither feeds nor is fed by a strong socio-cultural base. 
 In the second place, the sceptic might concede the postnational relevance of 
constitutionalism if registered or conceived of as a constraint upon government authority rather 
than as the prior establishment of that authority. The typical motivation here, as befits the 
sceptical temper, is one of suspicion of postnational authority. Constitutionalism is understood 
negatively. It embraces the limiting dimension of 'constituted' authority - the legal reduction and 
restriction of governmental power.
18
 This involves an actual or projected set of measures 
intended to limit or monitor the flow of power towards a new postnational entity and so away 
from the state, which is thereby preserved as the proper source and site of constitutional law 
conceived of affirmatively – as the basic capacity to govern. Again the EU Constitutional Treaty 
provides a case in point. When in the heat of debate avowedly Eurosceptical sources such as The 
Economist magazine were won over to the idea of a European Union Constitution, it was because 
                                                 
16
 See e.g., M. Kumm, “Beyond Golf Clubs and the Judicialization of Politics: Why Europe has a Constitution 
Properly So Called” (2006) 54 American Journal of Comparative Law 505-530. 
17
 J. Weiler The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 1999) 298. 
18
 See Section 2 above. 
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such a document, by dint of new or enhanced mechanisms such as a Charter of Rights and a 
competence catalogue, was seen as way of conditioning and reining in rather than embedding 
and augmenting supranational capacity.
19
  
What these two cases reveal, on closer inspection, is a link between the diverse roots of the 
constitutional idea, with its expansive range of descriptive, diagnostic and prescriptive 
references, and its flexible response to new circumstances. On the one hand, both in descriptive 
and diagnostic vein, the sense of a constitution as a canonical document or set of documents 
containing a discrete body of positive law - upon which one strand of the sceptical concession to 
postnational constitutional law depends - has long existed alongside the sense of the constitution 
as referring to the deep and interlayered structure of established power within the polity. As far 
back as the classical Roman state, the idea of constitution has incorporated this double sense,
20
 
ambiguously poised between reference to the process or immediate product of legal 
‘constituting’, and reference to what we recognize as firmly established – as already 
‘constituted’.21 The thin positive and the thick non-positive versions of constitutionalism today 
track this etymological duality.  
On the other hand, and in both descriptive and prescriptive vein, there is just as venerable and 
just as resilient a distinction between constitutional law as gubernaculum and constitutional law 
as jurisidictio, with the one referring to the establishment of governmental capacity and the other 
to the forms - actual or ideal - of its restraint.
22
 The invocation of constitutionalism as a bridle 
upon new forms of postnational power refers back, once again, to one just one half of a 
continuing distinction. 
If we now turn to the ways in which postnational public law is acknowledged in minor key 
from a sceptical perspective, a similar pattern emerges. On the one hand, markedly more so than 
in transnational constitutionalism, which, considered as law, tends to remain merely aspirational, 
                                                 
19
 See The Economist, December 15
th
, 2001. 
20
 In imperial times the decrees of the emperor, which collectively defined the extent of state action, were known as 
constitutions; see G. Maddox, “A Note on the Meaning of ‘Constitution’” (1982) 76 American Political Science 
Review 805-809; D. Grimm “Types of Constitution” in M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajo (eds) The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: OUP, 2012) 98-132. 
21
 According to one author, the idea of constitution, by embracing such contrasting emphases, “seems to cut across 
the essentialist-nonessentialist distinction” D. Lutz Principles of Constitutional Design (Cambridge: CUP, 2006) 
188. 
22
 See e.g., C. H. McIlwain Constitutionalism Ancient and Modern (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1958, 2
nd
 ed.). 
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or implicit, or limited to sub-legal regulatory contexts, there are many solid traces of publicness 
in transnational legal doctrine. In any external account, therefore, these will be unavoidably and 
so uncontroversial described as such. For example, a number of key concepts in both EU law and 
the law of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) - the continent's two most 
prominent transnational legal orders - invoke the idea of publicness. These include public 
morality, public policy, public health, public security, public safety and public order.
23
 In the one 
case - EU law - the relevant terms qualify the unconstrained transnational circulation of the 
factors of production, while in the other - the ECHR - they qualify the transnational protection of 
rights and freedoms. And while the superficial thrust of these and similar concepts may be 
against transnationalism, with the ‘public’ point of reference for the interest or good in question 
often being the public of a specific state, or at least the public located in the territory of a specific 
state, that by no means tell us the whole story. Sometimes the interest or good of a wider 
transnational public constituency is clearly in contemplation,
24
 and in all cases the concepts 
themselves are defined by reference to broad state-indifferent and -transcendent standards, 
subject to the authoritative interpretation and enforcement of the transnationally located and 
empowered judicial and administrative organs of the EU and ECHR. 
Let us now switch focus from first-order doctrine to the second-order disciplinary 
classification of legal material
25
 - a category which, in its double connotation of the 'passive' 
collation of doctrinal materials and their 'active' arrangement, straddles the distinction between 
detached and engaged, and between descriptive, diagnostic and prescriptive. Here we can report, 
first, a further uncontroversial, if modest, core of common understanding of public law’s 
transnational resonance. Today, the idea of a state-internal discipline of ‘public law’ as 
concerned to demarcate those areas in which the state and its emanations and analogues are in 
direct relation with individuals and other legal persons, or in which different organs or agencies 
of the state are in relationship with one another, remains common ground as an organizing and 
educating frame – as one of the essential maps through which we contemplate and comprehend 
                                                 
23
 See variously, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Arts 36, 45 and, 52; European Convention on 
Human Rights, Arts 8-11. 
24
 For example, as regards restrictions on free movement between states within the EU on grounds of public health, 
given the form taken by the threat in question those controls designed to prevent the spread of diseases with 
epidemic potential are clearly aimed at safeguarding the European ‘public’ in general and not just particular national 
or territorial publics; see Directive 2004/38/EC (Citizens’ free movement rights), Art 29. 
25
 I develop this distinction at length in “On the Necessarily Public Quality of Law” in C. Michelon et al (eds) n2 
above, 9-34. 
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the legal world. Equally, no-one would deny the continuing cartographical relevance of the 
disciplinary domain of ‘public international law’. It remains the key classificatory term to 
distinguish the corpus of law that subsists between states from the corpus of choice-of-law rules 
concerning the appropriately applicable internal state law in situations where there is more than 
one candidate, which latter goes under the label of ‘private international law’.26  
For sceptics, of course, the publicness of public international law has been, and remains, a 
derived or delegated characteristic, and so, on account of its lack of autonomy, of only marginal 
contribution to the fund of postnational law. It is branch of law qualifying as public precisely 
because authorized between the primary locations of ‘publicness’, namely the states. However, 
beyond this uncontroversial core meaning, the disciplinary label that the sceptics are prepared to 
endorse has long been the subject of a more expansive reading. Here, at the cutting diagnostic 
and prescriptive edge of disciplinary classification, the publicness of public international law has 
always been understood, in the alternative, in state-unbound cosmopolitan terms - as a separately 
sourced ius gentium.
27
 And even for sceptics, importantly, there are some features of the 
doctrinal field framed by public international law, such as general principles or ius cogens, which 
it is difficult to make sense of without conceding something to a vision which claims validity and 
authority other than as the delegated product of state consent.
28
 
   
 We will have more to say about more expansive disciplinary renderings of postnational 
public law below.
29
 The immediate point to pursue is that our sense of publicness of law, at least 
as much as that of constitutionalism, is widely ramified, with diverse historical roots and 
resonances across pre-modern and modern ages. Although perennially concerned with the 
framing either of the self-recognizing subjects or of the resilient contexts of collective action and 
interaction that reach beyond the confines of family or other special affinity, the idea of the 
public in law has had many and diverse particular orientations.
30
 Sometimes our sense of legal 
                                                 
26
 On the origins of the distinction between public and private international law, see H. Muir Watt “Private 
International Law Beyond the Schism” (2011) 2 Transnational Legal Theory 347-428. 
27
 See e.g., J. Waldron, “Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium” (2005) 119 Harvard Law Review129-147; N. 
Walker, “Out of Place and Out of Time: Law’s Fading Co-ordinates” (2010) 14 Edinburgh Law Review 13-46. 
28
 See e.g. E. de Wet, “The International Constitutional Order” (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 51-76.  
29
 See Section 4(a). 
30
 Raymond Geuss captures this diversity well: “there is no such thing as the public/private distinction, or, at any 
rate, it is a deep mistake to think that there is a single substantive distinction here that can be made to do any real 
philosophical or political work.” Public Goods, Private Goods (2003) (106). Instead, he claims, it is a division that 
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publicness concerns the openness or expansiveness of modes of access to or control over 
property, space or information; sometimes it concerns the realm of matters that concern everyone 
as opposed to purely personal or group concerns (i.e. res publicae); and sometimes the emphasis 
is on the limits rather than the extent of the public domain - on the ‘liberal’ demarcation of a 
protected area of private activity and autonomous choice.
31
 Depending on the context and the 
background, doctrinal questions may vary, the public/private boundary may be drawn at a 
different diagnostic point, and the prescriptive consequences of the classificatory choice may 
diverge.  
Publicness in law, then, even from a sceptical vantage point, is perhaps more accurately 
described as a disseminating rather than as a disappearing category. And in that dissemination, 
and especially as it crosses the ‘species barrier’ between state and non-state, we see evidence, at 
the margins, of legal doctrine and thought evolving in a reflexive manner. Legal concepts of 
publicness, whether first-order doctrinal practice or second-order disciplinary framing, do not 
come to be applied to non-state contexts randomly, but rather through an iterative and 
progressive process of conscious adaptation, or tacit affirmation of resemblance, to the statist 
heritage. Even for those most sceptical of transnational legal publicness, therefore, the propensity 
for non-robust strains of legal publicness to pass from state to transnational must be recognized 
as an inevitable feature of the evolution of law’s discursive register in an age of the development 
of new transnational circuits of economic and cultural power. 
 4. Selective Scepticism 
So far, in emphasizing both the underlying statist bias of constitutionalism and public law 
and the undeniability of a postnational supplement, we have concentrated on what our two key 
notions have in common. In the present section, as we come to consider more discriminating 
forms of scepticism, the focus will switch to the ways in which they differ.  
(a) Transnational constitutional scepticism 
                                                                                                                                                             
has grown over pre-modern and modern times, bringing together “[d]isparate components – conceptual fragments, 
theories, folk reactions, crude distinctions that are useful in highly specific practical contexts, tacit value 
assumptions - from different sources and belonging to different spheres”. (10) 
31
Ibid chs 2-4.  
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   Let us turn, first, to the transnational constitutional sceptics. Unlike the double sceptics, 
they believe in a robust conception of public law beyond the state, while remaining sceptical 
about transnational constitutionalism. This position is perhaps most closely associated with the 
work of the Global Administrative Law project,
32
 but includes other similar transnational visions 
of public law.
33
 The focus is on the proliferating regimes of transnational regulation that exercise 
authority of the kind traditionally associated with the public authority of the state, but where the 
link with the original authority of the state has been radically attenuated or lost. These new 
regimes range widely in form and substance, including the globally extended administrative and 
regulatory activities of UN bodies such as the World Health Organization and the Financial 
Action Task Force; informal transnational financial networks such as the Basle Committee of 
heads of central banks; bottom-up co-ordinated administration between national regulators with 
overlapping objectives in matters such as nuclear safety and biodiversity conservation; hybrid 
public/private transnational representative bodies such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers; and purely privately initiated but broadly publicly-endorsed bodies such as 
the International Standardisation Organization, concerned with product harmonization, or 
international sport’s World Anti-Doping Agency. 34 
   In the development of this orientation we observe the drawing of a key distinction - one 
which, at we shall see, implicitly informs much position-taking in the postnational debate. For in 
the perspective of Global Administrative Law, the emphasis tends to be on ‘throughput’ or 
process, and ‘output’ or substantive outcomes, over 'input' and pedigree. On the one hand, this 
kind of approach doubts the prospects of the constitutional form being reproduced at the 
transnational level - at least the deep form associated with a “foundational constitutionalism”35 
grounded in the constitutive pact of the self-identifying people. On the other hand, continuity is 
claimed with the state public law tradition in terms of basic ideals and operating system. 
According to one prominent scholar of Global Administrative Law, for example, the manifold 
sites of transnational administrative justice operating in the absence of - or attenuated from - 
state constitutional roots, should be framed and guided by general principles of legality, 
                                                 
32
 The literature is huge. For the formative text, see B. Kingsbury, R. B. Stewart and N. Krisch “The Emergence of 
Global Administrative Law” (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15. 
33
 See e.g. Von Bogdandy et al n1 above; D. Dyzenhaus (ed) The Unity of Public Law (Oxford: Hart, 2004). 
34
 See Kingsbury et al, n32 above. 
35
 See N. Krisch Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010). 
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rationality and proportionality, together with respect for the Rule of Law and basic protection of 
human rights.
36
 Over time, it is claimed, these normative ideals, all of which are concerned, not 
with the original pedigree or the generation of political power, but with the tasks of “channeling, 
managing, shaping and constraining political power”37 during or ‘after the fact’ of its emergence 
in the countless crevices of transnational authority, tend to circulate more widely and more 
readily. Gradually, “as the layers of common normative practice thicken, they come to be argued 
for and adopted through a mixture of comparative study and a sense that they are (or are 
becoming) obligatory.”38  
      The accent, therefore, is on how newly ‘publicized’ forms of authority can compensate 
for the kind of originary constituent power that we associate with the state constitutional tradition 
and which is difficult if not impossible to replicate in the postnational context. On this reading, 
the public quality of legal authority is defined first and foremost in contradistinction to a purely 
private conception, where only the personal or narrow sectional interests of particular individual 
or populations count and where law is merely instrumental to these interests. Instead, the 
affirmation of the ‘public’ quality of law involves the insistence that the collective interest of 
“the whole society”39 somehow be served. That collective interest may be identified and acted 
upon by reference to general criteria of ‘good’ governance‘, whose overall objectivity and 
situational appropriateness is guaranteed by a combination of strong process standards of 
transparency, reason-giving and accountability and a complex dynamic of social learning and 
reinforcement and mutual responsibilization across the myriad sites of transnational regulation. 
 It is worth stressing, however, that this kind of approach engages only part of our 
understanding of law’s ‘public’ quality. As was mentioned earlier, ‘publicness’ registers at two 
levels in our imagination of modern law. It applies both to the particular collective ‘public’ as the 
source or reference point of law, and to the domain of ‘public’ matters and interests which are to 
be treated as matters of general concern through law. The first sense of public is particular and 
nominal, while the second is general and adjectival. And it is only the second sense that tends to 
                                                 
36
 See Kingsbury, “The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law” n1 above; “International Law as Inter-
Public Law” n1 above. 
37
 Kingsbury, ‘The Concept of Law’ n1 above, 32. 
38
 Ibid 30. 
39
 Waldron n1 above, 39. 
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be emphasized by the transnational constitutional sceptics.
40
 They do so armed with the double 
conviction that a general political ethic of ‘public’ reason and concern can seek to fill the 
absence of a constitutive ‘public’ - can simulate the kind of commitment to individual-respecting 
pursuit of the common good that any such voluntary collective would be bound to endorse - and 
that, in any case, there is little or no scope in the transnational domain to remedy that absence.  
 (b) Transnational public law scepticism 
Conversely, those who are sceptics of transnational public law but affirmers of transnational 
constitutionalism tend to be more interested in new origins and ‘input’ – in the distinctiveness of 
the motivating source - than in the form of the throughput or the content of the output. The focus 
here is on the familiarly ‘constitutive’ nature of the regulation of increasingly differentiated 
social fields, themselves unfamiliar in terms of and irreducible to the general public/private 
divide. Gunther Teubner, a leading exponent of the theory of ‘societal constitutionalism’, has 
developed one of the most refined - not to say rarified - versions of this approach.
41
 
For all his use of constitutional language, Teubner is at pains to distinguish his approach 
from the conventional wisdom of foundational constitutionalism. The idea of the constitution as 
a documentary initiative through which pre-political collective potential, or constituent power, is 
transformed into full-blown legal and political community is one he finds misleading and 
underspecified even at the level of the state, and all the more inadequate in the highly fragmented 
transnational sphere where the “general ubiquity”42 of state action knows no parallel. The 
collective subjects of transnational regimes are more specialist and their remit is more restricted. 
The idea of a cosmopolitan ‘people’ or ‘public’ forming the basis of an encompassing 
normatively-ordered political society, therefore, holds little relevance - even as founding myth 
still less as an empirical substrate.
 
 Not only are the ‘public policy’ sectors familiar from the 
integrated state polity divided into so many transnational regimes, but different societal sub-
systems which extend beyond the traditional purview of public policy, for example in the 
organization of the economy, or of education or sport, or of the arts or the sciences, operate 
                                                 
40
 Krisch (n35 above) is a notable exception. His critique of state-centred foundational constitutionalism does not 
prevent him from promoting an idea of ‘public autonomy’, which, significantly influenced by Habermas, is as 
concerned with the constitutive conditions of publicness in postnational sectors as it is with the means by which and 
the standards according to which it is sustained ( (89-105)  
41
 See in particular, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization (Oxford: OUP, 2012). 
42
 Ibid. 132 
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according to codes which employ the normative incentives of law in variable and or more or less 
central ways. 
43
 
 Yet Teubner would maintain that the idea of transnational constitutionalism, quite 
differently conceived from the statist original, nevertheless remains important as a way of 
accounting for a highly differentiated societal formation and understanding the legitimacy 
requirements of the new global configuration. Drawing on the insights of systems theory, rather 
than discard the idea of constituent power, he reinterprets it as “a communicative potential, a 
type of social energy”44 - a way of characterizing the collective “’constitutional subject’ [as] not 
simply a semantic artifact ... but rather a pulsating process at the interface of consciousness and 
communication”.45 Teubner, in short, wants to treat societal constitutionalism as a fluid form of 
sectoral self-constitution. And in so doing he distinguishes between the widely replicated and 
increasingly intensified function of sectoral differentiation and specialization, which he sees as a 
key feature of the general dynamic of transnational society, and the particular self-generating 
process followed and form taken, which varies significantly not only from the original statist 
paradigm but also between different global sub-sectors. The many "capillary constitutions"
46
 of 
transnational society, to which more or less formal legal documents  - from framework treaties to 
industry codes - contribute to a variable extent, supply in their very different contexts both a 
symbology of collective self-understanding and self-projection and an operating code or social 
technology for the framing of collective action.  
In a key set of insights, Teubner argues that in their discrete specialization and functional 
concentration the sub-spheres of transnational society escape our received modern distinction 
between a generically public and a generically private sphere, and so cannot be assessed and 
evaluated in accordance with conventional standards of a holistic public interest and public good. 
Rather, we should understand and judge their constitutional adequacy in terms of their success in 
achieving a balance between the autonomy and self-limitation of different functional sectors 
inter se in a highly fragmented global order – with autonomy as a deep freedom and equality-
                                                 
43
 Ibid. Ch.4 
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 Ibid. 62. 
45
 Ibid. 63. 
46
 Ibid. 83. 
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respecting modern ideal retained and inherited from the statist tradition.
47
 On this view, the key 
‘constitutive’ puzzle faced by the stakeholders of relatively autonomous global subsectors and by 
those who occupy their various external environments, namely how to balance the freedom of 
those most centrally concerned with and affected by a practice to govern that practice against the 
need to limit its expansion into other spheres and to curb its tendency to encroach on the 
autonomy of others sectors of social practice and their key stakeholders, can nevertheless still be 
rendered in constitutionally recognizable terms. For, arguably, is the moral equivalent under a 
globally differentiated order of the constitutive design puzzle of the high modern order; namely, 
how to safeguard the ‘internal sovereignty’ of ‘the people’ while ensuring that their ‘external 
sovereignty’ did not compromise the internal sovereignty of others.48 
This approach, many of its insights endorsed by those who do not share Teubner’s 
attachment to systems theory,
49
 provides the reverse image to transnational constitutional 
scepticism. Just as law’s ‘publicness’, through historical and continuing usage, is a fertile enough 
signifier to include input as well as throughput and output dimensions, so, conversely, 
constitutional law, as we have seen, is a sufficiently versatile category to include not just the 
constitution but also the regulation and restraint of political authority; to repeat, not just the 
exercise of constituent power and its transformation into gubernaculum, but also jurisidictio. So 
while the point of departure may be different, each term ultimately extends across the same 
territory, and, indeed, has done so - with different emphases at different times and places - 
throughout the modern age in which it has served as a state-centred discourse.
50
 Yet just as 
constitution-sceptic projects such as Global Administrative Law tend to engage only that part of 
law’s public quality which does not deal with ‘constitutive’ matters,51 so, conversely, public-law-
                                                 
47
 See e.g.  G. Teubner, “Constitutionalising Polycontextuality” (2011) 20 Social and Legal Studies 209-234. 
48
 Ibid. See also Krisch, n35 above, espousing very similar views about the need to “balance inclusiveness and 
particularity” (101) in autonomous sectors, while eschewing the language of constitutionalism ( see also n40 above). 
49
 See Krisch n35 above; see also the work of Charles Sabel and his collaborators, e.g. C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin “The 
New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU” (2008) 14 European Law Journal, 271-327; from a 
more culturally informed conception of difference, see J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of 
Diversity (Cambridge: CUP, 1995); and from a more international law-focused perspective, see A. Peters 
“Membership in the Global Constitutional Community” in J. Klabbers, A. Peters and G. Ulfstein (eds) The 
Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2009) 153-263, 201-3 
50
 On these shifts of emphasis, see N. Walker “Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy: An 
Iterative Relationship” in (2010) 39(3) Rechtsfilosofie & rechtstheorie 206-233, 206-13. 
51
 But see Krisch ns 35 and 40 above. We should not, however, be surprised by such exceptions. As becomes more 
generally evident in our discussion of double affirmation in Section 5 below, the deep and resilient distinction 
between particular and general, input and throughput/output, is only loosely reflected in the discriminating choice of 
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sceptic projects such as societal or sectoral constitutionalism engage only that dimension of 
constitutionalism that does deal with such matters. In other words, whereas transnational 
constitutional skepticism eschews the nominal and particular in favour of the adjectival and the 
general, transnational public law scepticism tends to do precisely the opposite. It concentrates on 
the many particulars of a fragmented constitutional landscape, as well as the relations between 
these particulars, at the expense of any conception of internal standards which are general across 
domains. 
 An only selective scepticism, therefore, as in the two above cases, is, equally, an only 
selective affirmation of the transferability of a state-centred legal rubric to the transnational 
domain. Selectivity, of course, does not imply arbitrariness. Each approach has its reasoned 
elaboration. Transnational constitutional scepticism is born of a sense that the prospects of a 
postnational constituent power are remote, while it is possible to replicate other parts of the 
public law portfolio. Transnational public law scepticism is born of a sense that generic 
publicness lacks traction in the fragmented transnational world, yet that it remain possible, 
mutatits mutandis, to identify the formative influences and take seriously the constitutive 
credentials of these fragments. But, of course, neither side can be correct in their selective 
critique without undermining the other; and by dint of their disagreement, they threaten to return 
us to the double sceptical position. Are there any other alternative which allow the affirmative 
dimension of one or both positions to be salvaged?  
 
 5. Double affirmation 
If we turn, finally, to the double affirmers of transnational constitutionalism and transnational 
public law, they seek to provide a positive answer to our last question. Again we can identify two 
distinct positions. Unlike the selective sceptics, these positions do not start from the premise that 
the promise of the state-centred approach can only be partially redeemed at the transnational 
level. Rather, while they continue to focus on the mobility of one aspect of the statist legacy, 
                                                                                                                                                             
the language of constitutionalism or publicness. As noted in Section 3(b) of the text, the terms are just too broad and 
varied in their historical signification to become narrowly compartmentalized and consistently applied in 
contemporary postnational use. See also n73 below. 
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they view this as the key aspect, and, therefore, as capable of securing a full(er) reiteration of the 
virtues of the state-centred approach transnationally. Yet these approaches remain inherently 
one-sided. Just as between the transnational public law sceptics and the transnational 
constitutional sceptics, in their development and defence we can observe a continuing tension 
between an input or pedigree conception of authority and a throughput or output conception. 
(a) Postnational constituent power 
In the first place, there are those who have argued for the applicability of a version of 
constitutionalism bearing a significant family resemblance to state-based foundational 
constitutionalism to post-state entities such as the EU. The idea here – one I have endorsed52 - is 
that even in the “post-constituent”53 remoteness of a mature transnational regulation system 
which first emerged as a merely intergovernmental compact, it is possible, through a 
documentary constitutional settlement presented as a self-standing political pact, to homologate 
or nurture a sense of a meta-democratically validated transnational political community with a 
wide-ranging political agenda and a distinct sense of the public good. On this view, the vital co-
ordinates of a robustly autonomous legal supranationalism - namely transnational demos, 
transnational public sphere and transnational public law – need not be contradicted by or 
precluded by an extant sense of political community and framework of constitutional and public 
law at the national level.
54
  
Of course, such a view remains vulnerable to failure of initiative – as in the EU case, or, even 
if the initiative were to be successful, to the possible failure of its long-term post-initiative 
gambit to reinforce the socio-political contours of political community that it presupposes.
55
 It 
also remains vulnerable, on a broader front, to the charge that this kind of popularly endorsed 
constitutional initiative is, in any case, quite inappropriate to most contexts of transnational 
regulation, and that the alternative ‘constitutive’ and self-regulatory foundations of the sectoral 
                                                 
52
 See e.g. N. Walker, “The European Union’s Unresolved Constitution” in Rosenfeld and Sajo (eds) n20 above, 
1185-1208. 
53
 See N. Walker, “Post-constituent Constitutionalism? The Case of the EU” in Loughlin and Walker (eds) The 
Paradox of Constitutionalism (Oxford: OUP, 2007) 247-68. 
54
 Habermas is a key reference point here. See e.g. his “Why Europe Need s A Constitution” (2001) 11 New Left 
Review 5; “The Crisis of the European Union in the Light of a Constitutionalization of International Law” (2012) 23 
European Journal of International Law 335-48. 
55 See e.g., A Moravcsik, “What Can we Learn from the Collapse of the European Constitutional Project?” (2006) 
47 Politische Vierteljahresschrift 2. 
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‘post--public’ regimes cited by the champions of societal constitutionalism in these other and 
increasingly typical contexts of transnational regulation provide at best a poor substitute in terms 
of ‘democratic’ pedigree.56  
One riposte to this criticism, recalling the general charge of undue pessimism leveled at the 
double sceptics, is that we should not underestimate the potential for the democratic regeneration 
of international organizations, even if this does not take the Big ‘C’ Constitutional form 
attempted in the EU. In recent year, there has, for instance, been a revival in ideas of 
transnational parliamentarianism, building on existing examples in institutions such as the 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, the MERCOSUR Parliament, the Pan-African Parliament of 
the African Union, and the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly.
57
 Yet, with the exception of 
certain radical but only marginally supported schemes for a global popular assembly,
58
 and of 
others which seek to build on a strongly international communitarian reading of the post-war 
founding of the United Nations,
59
 such models tend to renounce or marginalize any ambition to 
found such democracy in a constitutive transnational ‘people’. Rather, the emphasis tends to be 
on how democracy can be reconfigured in ways which stress more or less direct forms of 
representation, and upon proxy values such as transparency and deliberation.
60
  
What is most revealing about this strain of thinking, and the reservations it incorporates or 
provokes, is that transnational foundational constitutionalism is challenged not just because of its 
false or misplaced empirical credentials. What we find is not only a questioning of the 
plausibility of a transnational popular sovereignty, or a fear that, to the extent that it is plausible, 
this would result in an unwelcome hollowing out of national democracy – attitudes which we 
find variably distributed amongst both the double skeptics and the transnational constitutional 
sceptics. In addition, though sometimes obscured by these more prominent objections, even 
many of those who appear relatively optimistic about transnational democratic potential and 
well-disposed towards its fulfillment, nevertheless seem to be anxious about asking for too much 
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 See e.g., D. Grimm “The Achievement of Constitutionalism and its Prospects in a Changed World” in P. Dobner 
and M. Loughlin (eds) The Twilight of Constitutionalism?(Oxford: OUP, 2010) 3-22. 
57
 See e.g. , A Von Bogdandy, “The European Lesson for International Democracy: The Significance of Articles 9-
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of a good thing. Rather than bemoan or apologize for the cultural limits to transnational 
democratic growth, they tend to emphasis the importance of other forces – expertise, 
impartiality, policy long-sightedness - and values – individual and minority rights, associational 
autonomy – as supplementary and even moderating influences in the transnational constitutional 
domain.
61
 What this suggests, importantly, is that inasmuch as the double affirmation of the 
transnational relevance of constitutionalism and public law is claimed to rest predominantly upon 
the constitutive side of the equation – on the authorizing legitimacy and energizing effect of new 
sites of constituent power and their attendant public spheres – there is a standing reluctance to 
treat this as an unalloyed good. 
(b) Cosmopolitan public law 
An alternative doubly affirmative vision is of a continuous and “cosmopolitan”62 
constitutionalism and public law. For Mattias Kumm – a thoughtful and influential exponent of 
this view - the modernist past, understood senso largo, remains the key to the future. The 
philosophical core and basic ‘political imaginary’63 of constitutionalism and public law - terms 
which, tellingly, he treats as entirely compatible, indeed as virtually interchangeable, in the 
postnational domain
64
 -  has not altered since the advent of modern constitutionalism through the 
medium of the maturing state system of late 18th century Europe and America. Crucially, what is 
constitutionally basic for him is not a matter of institutional architecture, still less of the 
conception of pedigree that informs that architecture, but of the underlying normative principles 
and the imagining of society that nurtures these normative principles. These normative principles 
flow from the basic modernist constructivist ambition with which we are already familiar from 
the perspective of the state-centred double sceptics.
65
 This involves a vision, distinct from the 
coercive, personal or metaphysically valorized power systems of the mediaeval ages, of persons 
self-conceived as free and equal individuals acting collectively to deliberate, develop and 
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implement their own conception of the common interest or public good. From these origins, 
according to Kumm, we can derive a set of universal constitutional and public law commitments 
to principles of legality, subsidiarity, adequate participation and accountability, public reason and 
rights-protection.
66
 
 Against this larger canvas, it is argued, the detail of the traditional state-centred public law 
system assumes a more modest significance than is often appreciated within constitutional 
thought. It is exposed as but one institutional blueprint for giving effect to the underlying 
principles, rather than an exclusive, dominant or even optimal template for constitutional 
government. Instead, under conditions of intensifying globalization the basically cosmopolitan 
texture of any constitutionalism committed to universal principles becomes more apparent, and 
the state is now but one constitutional player on a wider stage. As free and equal persons 
operating under certain constraints of interest, information, geography and affinity, we continue 
to respect particular contexts of decision-making and public interest formation, and the principles 
of subsidiarity, participation and accountability recognize this. However, as free and equal 
persons we are also categorically committed to acknowledgment of the freedom and equality of 
all others, and so to the universalisability of our political condition. In this way, we can reconcile 
our attachment to particular polities and sites of authority with a belief in an overarching 
normative framework which informs the terms of our various particular manifestations of public 
authority. In the final analysis, the global division of the world into particular polities remains 
inevitable, but the particular form that such a division takes is not so; rather, it is contingent upon 
shifts in the underlying circuits of social and economic power. What is more, the universalist 
pole of the commitment implies that the particular pedigree, including the immediate democratic 
deficiencies of that pedigree – is less important than commitment to the very ideals and 
principles which both underpin democratic pedigree and would provide its ‘natural’ complement. 
   For all its suggestiveness, the Kumm thesis is open to a range of criticisms that mirrors the 
challenge to the idea of postnational constituent power. On the one hand, there is an empirical 
critique. Even if we are attracted to its vision, is the cosmopolitan approach not vulnerable to the 
charge of utopianism, or of complacency? If understood primarily in aspirational terms, is there 
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not a chasm between the cosmopolitans principles and the actual state of global politics and 
economics, a pattern marked by the combination of fugitive power – of collectively unauthorized 
and unaccountable concentrations of transnational interests, and an increasingly obtuse and 
incoherent network of legal authority? Against this, Kumm counters that cosmopolitanism, far 
from describing a distant ideal, is actually the ‘best’ interpretation of much historical and 
existing constitutional practice both in and beyond the state. Yet while he is adept at showing 
how certain legal sites do demonstrate a sophisticated appreciation of the demands of 
cosmopolitan public reason, it is notable that these tend to be judicial sites, and tend to be 
situated in the European stronghold of mature postnational governance.
67
 There remains a danger 
of complacency in this assessment, a failure to explain how public reason can systematically 
prevail over private interest in contexts where the conditions of public will formation, and the 
epistemic and authoritative weight associated with such will formation, are often conspicuous by 
their remoteness or absence.  
    On the other hand, there is a normative critique, which connects to and reinforces elements 
of the empirical critique. In theory as well as in practice, does the universalism and singularity of 
Kumm’s vision, - the idea that the general principles of constitutionalism and public law are 
applicable to all circumstances and can always be interwoven to form one cloth -not threaten to 
subordinate the nominal and particular dimensions of constitutionalism and publicness unduly to 
the adjectival and general? Certainly, the emphasis on subsidiarity and participation shows that 
Kumm is far from blind to the need to recognize the authority of collective voice. But does 
cosmopolitanism’s uniform algebra - its insistence on situating the voice of any particular public 
within a universal formula of good global governance - not unduly 'cabin' and curtail the idea of 
constituent power? In a nutshell, does his confidence in cosmopolitanism’s objective ability to 
discern and balance the principles of good governance not risk the very “triumphalism”68 which 
he himself so rightly diagnoses as the equally unpalatable polar alternative to the double 
sceptic’s constitutional nostalgia. Is this, in the final analysis, not just one more hegemonic move 
on behalf of a holistic constitutional vision, one that illegitimately downplays democratic 
pedigree?  
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6. Conclusion 
The retention of both constitutionalism and public law as central terms in the global legal 
prospectus speaks both to the promise and the challenge, the hopes and the fears, associated with 
a certain way of thinking about the world of law and politics. Beyond the state-reductivism of 
double scepticism, what the various conceptions of the transnational considered above suggest, 
and what is made most explicit in Kumm’s cosmopolitanism, is that in considering the 
continuing relevance of ideas of constitutionalism and public law we should draw a distinction 
between the architecture of a state-centred order and the deeper legal and political imaginary of 
the modern age. The state-centred architecture has certainly supplied the most developed 
articulation of that underlying imaginary, but just because the former may be eroding does not 
mean the latter should not or cannot be sustained. Continued investment in the ‘c’ word and the 
‘p’ word in the postnational context reflects that belief. Yet because both terms, as we have 
seen,
69
 operate across various levels of abstraction and can refer as much to concrete design as to 
underlying orientation, their retention also starkly poses the question - and exposes the 
difficulties - of finding and constructing a new and suitable architecture for a postnational 
modernity. 
Yet it is important to insist that the onus of responding to a shifting global power mosaic 
does not rest only with the postnational sympathizers. Even for the double sceptics, as we have 
seen, our key terms cannot but retain some currency in the postnational domain, whether as 
doctrinal innovation or descriptors of informal normativity, or as resources of disciplinary 
construction - and so of legal imagination more generally.
70
 What this underlines is that the 
resilience of our key concepts is not just about certain future possibilities to which only some 
subscribe, but about the insistent weight of our legacy and the inescapability of present 
circumstances, which all are bound to recognize. The legal world cannot be rethought and 
remade ab initio and holistically, but only with the doctrinal and conceptual resources we already 
have at our disposal and only through first addressing the particular circumstances in which we 
are already and inevitably implicated. Even for those who are pessimistic about their adequacy to 
any long-term vision of a postnational world, therefore, extant notions of constitutionalism and 
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public law remain vital, and so must be treated as at least minimally pliant resource in the short-
term - in the unavoidable matter of reflecting upon and responding incrementally to discrete 
shifts in our jurisgenerative circumstances. What is more, as there never can be a legal tabula 
rasa - as the contemplation of legal change always does and always will start with the here and 
now, and so with what is already in place - short-term response and long-term vision, in any 
world-view, are ultimately inextricable, necessarily mutually informative. This does not mean, of 
course, that the double sceptics are bound to become subscribers to robust postnational 
conceptions of constitutionalism or public law by default. But it does mean that they cannot 
avoid the long-term questions which lead some to offer such general postnational conceptions, or 
escape the fact that short-term and particular responses and solutions already and inevitably 
implicate the long-term and the general. 
Where, beyond the deep reservations of double scepticism, the debate over the future of 
constitutionalism and public law does become fully engaged, it tends to reduce to a tension 
between pedigree and process or content-centred definitions of law’s publicness. This we can 
already observe negatively, in the nostalgia of the double sceptics with their strong emphasis on 
pedigree. But it is also vividly present in the competing visions of the transnational public law 
sceptics and the transnational constitutionals sceptics, as well as in the tensions between different 
forms of double affirmation of transnational constitutionalism and public law.  
In conclusion, we can offer two thoughts about this stubborn fault-line - reflections which 
may themselves on first impression seem to stand in uneasy juxtaposition. On the one hand, the 
tension between input and output, subjective and objective, is one that is bound to recur and to 
renew itself in different postnational contexts. On the other hand, the recurrence of that tension 
and the divisions it provokes should not lead us to think that we are asking the wrong questions. 
In particular, it should not be taken as proof that the discourses of constitutionalism and public 
law are, after all, inappropriate to the postnational domain. Quite the opposite. Far from 
displaying the exhaustion of a paradigm, the tension in fact does no more than reflect the deep 
and resilient ambivalence of the modernist heritage of individual autonomy and equality as 
concerned simultaneously to valorize the collective expression of that autonomy and equality and 
to protect its individual expression from collective encroachment.
71
 This, as is evident from the 
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formulations of the double sceptics, has been as much a defining antinomy of the state-centred 
age and its legal expression as it is of our emergent postnational horizon. Long-standing 
opposition in the state context between collective and individual, voice and rights, supremacy of 
legislation and finality of adjudication, constituent power and constituted authority, and between 
the two resonances of constitutionalism - particular and universal,
72
 speak to precisely the same 
foregrounding of two orientations which provide necessary mutual support and supplementation 
while also being locked in mutual contestation.
73
 Each pole is both condition of and corrective to 
the other. What supplies vital balance also - and inexorably - breeds conflictual interplay. Just as 
in the state context, the contribution of the postnational iteration of constitutionalism and public 
law to the long course of modernity depends upon a continued appreciation that this is a 
relationship which, however altered its background circumstances, can and should know no final 
resolution.
74
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